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Five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and at the end of the first 
mandate of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), this analysis provides an 
in-depth view of the on-going institutional socialisation between Member State 
Embassies and EU Delegations. Specifically, it focuses on the Member States’ 
perceptions of the role of EU Delegations. These perceptions can back up or restrain 
the EU Delegations in fulfilling their mandate. More precisely, the paper examines to 
what extent the socialisation between EU Delegations and EU Member State 
Embassies helps the Delegations to fulfil their mandate in bilateral diplomacy. It 
argues that EU Delegations are still under dynamic processes of institutional 
socialisation with the Member States’ Embassies which increasingly accept and 
expect EU Delegations’ actions. The post-Lisbon context of EU Diplomacy is 
consolidating a primus inter pares role of Delegations being central hubs 
coordinating and implementing EU policies on the spot.  
  




The European Union (EU) disposes of a large diplomatic network that is not only able 
to represent it but to add value and decrease the costs of Member State diplomatic 
missions.  
Member States begin to understand the huge potential of EU Delegations in 
sharing premises, information, reports, and host non-resident diplomats. They 
decrease the existing network, mainly for financial reasons, and rely more on the 
services of the EU Delegations.1  
Five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the formal institutional 
transition from Commission to EU Delegations and the setting up a fully-functional 
European External Action Service (EEAS) is over. 2  Even though the transition is 
complex, the Delegations have managed to pass through it without substantial 
additional resources, and the record is mostly positive.3  
The presence of national diplomats in both the EEAS and the Delegations shows, 
from a neo-functionalist perspective, the consensus among Member States that 
adhering to common structures is the right path to follow in further rationalising 
diplomatic networks and reducing transaction costs. 4  Even if the on-going 
socialisation of working practices among staff members is crucial for consolidating 
an esprit de corps, it might hinder the analysis of the dynamics happening in the 
external diplomatic environment on which the fulfilment of the Delegations’ 
mandate largely depends. From an ‘outside-in’ perspective, the EU Delegations are 
still in transition marked by continuing processes of socialisation with the Member 
State Embassies, whose approach towards the EU diplomatic network can narrow 
down or broaden the Delegations’ mandate.  
Much of the existing research focuses on the post-Lisbon institutional transition and 
socialisation among staff members within EU Delegations. 5  From a sociological 
                                                          
1 D. O’Sullivan, EEAS Chief Operating Officer, speech, College of Europe, 18 March 2013 
[emphasis added].  
2 J.-C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, p. 256.  
3 European External Action Service, “EEAS Review”, Brussels, 1 July 2013, p. 12.  
4 R. Balfour et al., “Equipping the European Union for the 21st century”, FIIA Report, no. 36, 
Helsinki, 2013, p. 49.  
5 R. Formuszewicz et al., “The Practice of Appointing the Heads of EU Delegations in the Wake 
of Council Decision on the European External Action Service”, Polish Institute of International 
Affairs, August 2010, Warsaw, pp. 1-25.; M. Comelli et al., “Rehashed Commission Delegations 
or Real Embassies”, IAI Working Paper, vol. 11, 23 July 2011, pp. 1-30; R.-A. Marteaux, 
Enhancing Coherence and Consistency in EU External Action: The Importance of Training and 
Selection of EEAS Diplomats, Master’s thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2011.  
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perspective, this focus on formal administrative and legal elements limits the analysis 
to the rational-choice considerations behind setting up EU Delegations. Hence, there 
is a need to move from a rational to a social constructivist perspective. From this 
standpoint, “socialisation implies that an agent switches from following a logic of 
consequences [rational choices] to a logic of appropriateness [in which] agents 
accept community or organisational norms as the right thing to do”.6 This invites to 
see the extent to which the Member States perceive cooperation with Delegations 
as the right thing to do. Yet the post-Lisbon Delegations are not simply a result but a 
motor of socialisation from the diplomatic spot. The EU Delegations are “essential to 
the promotion of European Union policies, interests and values around the world”.7 In 
order to understand this, there is a need to move beyond the immediate aftermath 
of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon to identify the on-going developments 
and the possible emergence of ‘European Embassies’ for which the post-Lisbon 
Delegations are the corner stones.  
There is no single pattern of socialisation, but varying levels and dynamics which help 
to understand the complexity of diplomacy. It is practically impossible to define a 
prototype of a fully-fledged EU Delegation in terms of role and responsibilities which is 
valid for all diplomatic environments. In this context, the following question arises: to 
what extent does the socialisation between EU Delegations and EU Member State 
Embassies help the Delegations to fulfil their mandate in bilateral diplomacy? 
It has been demonstrated that EU Delegations in multilateral posts have mostly 
reached their potential in light of their relations with the Member States. 8 
Consequently, no major spill-over effect in representation, cooperation and 
implementation of policies is expected in EU Delegations to international 
organisations because of the presence of Member States, their strategic interests 
and their desire to retain access to international organisations. More interestingly, in 
bilateral diplomacy and mostly in relatively small third countries which are home to 
more minor Member States’ interests, the dissociation of presence in and access to 
                                                          
6  J. Checkel, International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 5. See also J.-G. March & J.P. 
Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, International Organization, 
vol. 52, no. 4, 1998, pp. 1-27.  
7  European Commission website, Tempus Glossary, EACEA, retrieved 10 April 2014, 
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/tools/glossary_en.php.  
8 See D. Dermendzhiev, The EU delegations four years after the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon: Do EU member states help delegations to fulfil their mandate?, Master’s thesis, 
Bruges, College of Europe, 2014. 
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diplomatic networks is more accentuated than in multilateral fora. Simultaneously, 
the overall process of rationalisation of national Embassies is paving the way for a 
bottom-up socialisation increasing the EU Delegations’ role and possibly leading to 
the advent of ‘European Embassies’, in which the EU Delegation has a leading role.9   
The scope of this paper is intentionally limited to Delegations dealing with shared 
and/or parallel competences, such as development cooperation, excluding those 
implementing the EU’s exclusive prerogatives, like the EU representation to the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), mainly because of the de facto limited role for the 
Member States. It will take the role of the Delegation to analyse the degree to which 
it is working at its ‘full’ potential. In light of the Member States’ missions, a Delegation 
can play a more complementary role, such as that of coordination in multilateral 
settings, or a more leading role, for example with regard to development 
cooperation in bilateral posts. The independent variable is the importance of the 
bilateral fora in terms of Member States’ direct political interests and the importance 
given to diplomatic presence and visibility. The explanatory factors are the number 
of coordination meetings, the existence of arrangements on representation, burden-
sharing and ‘co-location’ as well as other formal and informal practices of 
cooperation. They help to assess how the role of the Delegation is shaped according 
to the type of diplomatic posts and the Member States’ diplomatic practices in third 
countries and international organisations.  
The analysis is based on research on EU Delegations including books, academic 
articles, commentaries, official reports and studies, and also on more than ten 
interviews with senior EEAS and Commission officials whose contribution is key for a 
realistic analysis of the topic. 
The first part of this paper briefly examines the evolution of the pre-Lisbon Commission 
Delegations. I will analyse the Treaty provisions and the EEAS Decision in order to 
identify the legal spirit establishing the post-Lisbon Delegations and to ascertain what 
constitutes a fully-fledged EU Delegation from a legal perspective. The second part 
studies bilateral EU Delegations and analyses their role in providing tangible outputs 
to the Member States. It will study the on-going practices on burden-sharing, co-
                                                          
9 ‘Access’ relates to the link between power and networks of influence, while ‘presence’ is 
the physical diplomatic representations. On the disentanglement of ‘presence’ and ‘access’ 
in post-modern diplomacy see J. Batora & B. Hocking, Bilateral Diplomacy in the European 
Union: Towards ‘post-modern’ patterns?, The Hague, Clingendael, April 2008, p. 11. 
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location and ‘lap-top diplomacy’ to demonstrate the Member States’ increasing 
awareness on the added value of the Delegations.  
From Commission Delegations to EU Delegations: the rationale behind the Treaty of 
Lisbon’s upgrade 
 
Up to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission Delegations have been in a continuing 
transition towards shouldering more responsibilities and gradual recognition by the 
Member States and third actors. The Commission built up a huge network of around 
128 missions serving the Unified External Service, aiming at carrying out autonomous 
and coherent external diplomatic relations.10 The Treaty of Maastricht further entitled 
the Delegations with more traditional diplomatic tasks, including political analysis 
and reporting, but it is only the Treaty of Amsterdam that “reoriented” the EU’s 
missions towards more functions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).11  
Therefore, the Commission Delegations network started to fulfil duties of 
representation, together with the Presidency, but this was limited to non-CFSP issues. 
Increasingly accepted by the Member States, most of the Delegations were staffed 
up following the Prodi Commission’s (1999-2004) process of ‘de-concentration’ of the 
management of assistance programmes to the field.12 In addition, officials from the 
Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade) were also deployed in Delegations to 
manage the relations with strategic WTO members, but also staff from other DGs with 
third-country programmes and agreements. 13  Furthermore, the pre-Lisbon 
Delegations played a significant role in acceding countries and were mainly 
responsible for the implementation of the three pre-accession programmes (PHARE, 
ISPA and SAPARD)14 or for managing TACIS.15 They were also the contact points for 
local authorities in helping to implement the acquis and provided important input for 
the progress reports of the pre-accession phase.16  
                                                          
10 D. Spence & G. Edwards, The European Commission, London, John Harper, 2006, p. 406.  
11 Ibid., p. 14.  
12 European Commission, “Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the European Commission’ 
External Service”, DG External Relations, Brussels, 2004, p. 54.  
13 Ibid., p. 55. 
14 PHARE = Pologne-Hongrie: Aide à la Restructuration Economique; ISPA = Instrument for 
Structural Policies for Pre-Accession; and SAPARD = Special Accession Programme for 
Agriculture and Rural Development. 
15 TACIS = Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991-2006). 
16 Spence, op.cit., p. 412.  
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This activity demonstrates a certain degree of horizontal appropriation of the 
Commission’s diplomatic network by various EU institutions and services. Moreover, a 
comment by President Prodi on this evolution aptly illustrated the state of play:  
The role of the delegations has changed constantly [...]. [T]hey now [in 2003] carry 
out tasks relating to almost all the areas where the European Union has a part to 
play. This reflects the Union’s growing importance as a world global player.17 
Nevertheless, an important handicap of the pre-Lisbon diplomatic network were the 
unclear responsibilities in external representation and the lack of a formal role in CFSP 
coordination. The division of work between the rotating Presidency, responsible for 
political coordination and representation for CFSP matters, and the Delegations 
entrusted with the Commission’s policy fields, was an important source of 
incoherence for the EU’s external action.   
Nevertheless, as noted by the Commission, “the Delegations of the External Service 
[...] in practice serve European Union interests as a whole”.18 A few years before the 
Treaty of Lisbon, Delegations were in reality already dealing with areas of shared or 
parallel competence such as justice and home affairs or even with CFSP political 
analysis and reporting, thus going beyond the scope of the Commission’s exclusive 
powers.  
To sum up, the pre-Lisbon Delegations carried out a large variety of tasks, from 
presenting and implementing EU policies to assisting the rotating Presidency locally. 
However, ensuring the coherent management of these prerogatives required a joint 
External Service, as already suggested by the Convention on the Future of Europe 
(2002-03), and for which the legal basis was provided by the Treaty of Lisbon.19  
The pre-Lisbon Delegations had already undergone a long period of evolution and 
acceptance as a result of socialisation with the Member States’ missions and third 
actors. Having started off as Commission offices with a technical role, the 
Delegations were in reality by the mid-2000s quite similar in terms of involvement in 
policy fields to the current EU Delegations. However, the Lisbon Treaty bestowed 
upon the Delegations their formal role in external representation and coordination, 
opening the way for further consolidation of the EU’s diplomatic network, new 
dynamics of socialisation and increased value added. Therefore, the Treaty of Lisbon 
                                                          
17 Quoted in European Commission, “Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the European 
Commission External Service”, op.cit., p. 6.  
18 Ibid.   
19 J. Batora, “Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?”, Working 
Paper, no. 3, University of Oslo, 2006, p. 21. 
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did not create the EU Delegations ex-nihilo, but legally endorsed existing realities as 
part of the new institutional design of the EU’s external action and set up the 
ambitious goal of policy coherence.   
The Lisbon Treaty: towards EU Delegations as fully-fledged diplomatic missions?  
 
The legal provisions on the EU Delegations in the Treaties  
As mentioned above, the issue of consistency in the management of the 
Delegations was identified years before the Treaty of Lisbon and was reflected in the 
Convention’s proposal for creating a common External Service responding to the 
needs of a wide range of policies going far beyond the Commission’s 
competences.20 The current legal provisions on the EU Delegations paved the way to 
enhancing the EU’s actorness in terms of institutional autonomy and coherence on 
the ground.21 The Treaty of Lisbon’s ambition to enhance coherence and visibility 
resulted, in the area of external action, in providing the legal basis for the 
establishment of the EEAS:  
In fulfilling his [sic] mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a 
European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the 
diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from 
relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the 
Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the 
Member States.22 
The creation of the EEAS, based on Article 27(3) TEU and formally established by the 
EEAS Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010, is crucial in the evolution of the new EU 
Delegations’ role as the pre-Lisbon Delegations passed under the authority of the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-
President of the European Commission (HR/VP).23 
Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon reinforces the obligation for Member States and EU 
Delegations in third countries and international organisations to cooperate in 
contributing and implementing the EU’s ‘common approach’ (Article 32(3) TEU). In 
the wording of the Treaty of Maastricht (ex-Article 16 TEU), it was only the Member 
                                                          
20  S. Duke, “The Convention, the draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects and 
Implications for the EU and its international role, Working Paper, no. 2003/W/2, European 
Institute of Public Administration, p. 10.  
21 J. Paul, “EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon”, Center for Applied Policy Research, no. 2, June 
2008, p. 19. 
22 Article 27(3) TEU [emphasis added]. 
23 Council of the European Union, “Decision Establishing the organisation and functioning of 
the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU)”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 
201/30, 26 July 2010.  
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States who had the obligation among themselves to favour the convergence of their 
action under the CFSP in the most efficient way.24 Meanwhile, the EU counts on both, 
the EU Delegations and the Member States  
to cooperate in ensuring that decisions defining Union positions and actions 
adopted pursuant to this Chapter [Chapter 2 on CFSP] are complied with and 
implemented. They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information and 
carrying out joint statements.25 
This key provision in EU primary law reveals the spirit of cooperation and 
complementarity of the relations between EU Delegations and Member States on 
the ground. The Treaty of Lisbon is consistent in using the terms ‘cooperation’ and 
’cooperate’ which further clarifies the idea of having Delegations of a similar level of 
importance to the Member State Embassies to co-implement the EU’s common 
approach. Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon consigned external representation on CFSP 
matters, originally the remit of the Presidency, to the EU Delegations, since 
Delegations are now charged with representing the whole Union:  
Union Delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall 
represent the Union and shall be place under the authority of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They shall act in 
close cooperation with Member State’s diplomatic and consular missions.26 
This is the newly-inserted revolutionary provision stipulating “the pivotal role in 
external representation by EU delegations” and standing behind “a single diplomatic 
presence”.27 Taking over the Presidency tasks in representation and coordination, 
the EU Delegations are now responsible for all EU competences, including the CFSP. 
This change shall be seen in light of the overall objective of the Treaty of Lisbon to 
bring more coherence and sustainability to the EU’s external action.   
The Presidency, especially when held by bigger Member States having significant 
diplomatic backing, could potentially bring important impetus in specific CFSP fields 
which needs to be coordinated. Even if in terms of agenda-setting there is a sense of 
ownership and continuity among the Troika of Presidencies, the limited six-month 
Presidency term is far from sufficient to fulfil sustainable foreign policy goals.28 For 
other Member States, the new role of the EU Delegations in external representation 
                                                          
24  I. Pingel, Commentaire article par article des traité UE et CE : de Rome à Lisbonne, 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2010, p. 56.  
25 Article 35(1) and 35(2) TEU [emphasis added].  
26 Article 221(1) & 221(2) TFEU [emphasis added].  
27 S. Blockmans & C. Hillion, “EEAS 2.0: A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU 
establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, SIEPS, 7 
February 2013, p. 38. 
28 O’Sullivan, speech, op.cit.  
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would eventually lead to ‘competence creep’ for the Presidency.29 However, while 
the Presidency still has a moderate role in agenda-setting on trade and a powerful 
role in areas of shared competence at the Member State level, in terms of local 
external representation, it has no formal role in representation in areas of exclusive 
competence or CFSP. The Presidency retains a moderate role in areas of shared 
competence in international organisations.30 Nevertheless, the Presidency’s role in 
external representation and coordination is maintained in third-country delegations 
and in international organisations where there is no EU Delegation.31 In the broader 
EU context, the Treaty of Lisbon says that the Presidency should help the HR/VP in 
fulfilling her tasks. 32  Without further analysing the rationale behind limiting the 
Presidency’s role, the following part will focus on the EEAS Decision in order to flesh 
out the legal provisions on EU Delegations and their local cooperation with the 
Member States.  
Legal provisions on the EU Delegations’ relations with the Member States  
As provided for in the Treaties, the EEAS Decision further “obliges Union Delegations 
to work in close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services of 
the Member States”. 33  The idea of supporting the Member States instead of 
decreasing or even replacing their diplomatic presence is further articulated in the 
EEAS Decision:   
The EEAS shall support and work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the 
Member States, as well as with the General Secretariat of the Council and the 
services of the Commission, in order to ensure consistency between the different 
areas of the Union’s external action and between those areas and its other 
policies.34 
Hence, the EEAS Decision’s wording when referring to the relations between the EU 
Delegations and Member States is that of ‘support’ and ‘work in cooperation,’ 
aiming at ensuring consistency. ‘Support’, defined as “give assistance, approval, 
comfort, or encouragement to” highlights the complementary role of the EU 
                                                          
29 E.-M. Szabo, “Background Vocals: What role for the rotating presidency in the EU’s external 
Relations post-Lisbon”?, EU Diplomacy Paper, no. 5, 2011, Bruges, College of Europe, p. 13.  
30 Ibid., p. 14.  
31 As provided for in the “Arrangements establishing a system according to which Member 
States are to take on the functions of the Presidency in third countries”, the Presidency 
represents the EU in countries where there is no EU Delegation, such as Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, 
Brunei, Nord Korea, or Delegations at the level of a Chargé d’Affaires, for example Ecuador 
and Costa Rica.  
32 Piris, op.cit., p. 255.  
33 Blockmans, op.cit., p. 33.  
34 Article 3 EEAS Decision [emphasis added].   
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Delegations which is also underlined in Article 35 TEU. 35  Furthermore, the EU 
Delegation “shall support the Member States in their diplomatic relations and in their 
role of providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in third countries”.36 
Therefore, the EEAS Decision re-confirms that the Lisbon-designed EU Delegations are 
not supposed to compete with, but support the Member States locally. Moreover, 
from then on, it is up to the Head of Delegation (HoD), to represent the EU before the 
third country’s authorities:  
The Head of Delegation shall have the power to represent the Union in the country 
where the delegation is accredited, in particular for the conclusion of contracts, 
and as a party to legal proceedings.37 
The HoD’s role is crucial for the internal processes of socialisation as they “shall have 
authority over all staff [...] and [are] accountable to the HR for the overall 
management of the work of the delegation”.38 Furthermore, ensuring coherence is 
also the responsibility of the HoD as he or she “shall receive instruction from the HR 
and the EEAS, while in areas where the Commission’s power are concerned, the 
latter could issue instructions to delegations”.39 Hence, the HoD is de facto the ‘EU 
Ambassador’ who shall be accepted as pares by the Member State Ambassadors in 
his/her new coordinating and representing role. 
Bilateral diplomacy: towards a real European diplomatic network?  
The EU Delegations’ complementary role: are we moving beyond?  
This section will identify and analyse patterns of socialisation between EU Delegations 
and Member State Embassies in bilateral diplomacy. In modern diplomacy, States 
ensure their representation through residential presence, meaning entering into 
establishment agreements with the host state and setting up diplomatic missions 
ensuring the link between presence and access. 40 As a post-modern diplomatic 
actor, the EU is also opting for physical presence via its increasing networks of 
Delegations rather than post-modern ways of representation such as virtual or digital 
diplomacy. Most fundamentally this network provides solutions to the decreasing 
                                                          
35 Oxford Dictionaries, “Definition of support in English”. 
36 Article 5(10) EEAS Decision.  
37 Article 5(8) EEAS Decision [emphasis added].  
38 Article 5(2) EEAS Decision. 
39 Article 5(3) EEAS Decision. 
40 Batora & Hocking, op.cit., p. 10.  
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resources of the Member States and helps the EU Foreign Affairs Ministries to 
rationalise their external activities.41   
Similarly to multilateral fora, the bilateral EU Delegation chairs local coordination 
meetings. Unlike EU missions to international organisations, coordination in bilateral 
diplomacy does not have the same implications for representation of the EU by the 
Delegation as the diplomatic milieu does not require such intense coordination on 
representation as, for example, at the United Nations. The record on coordination 
meetings is generally positive, as “more often than not, the EU Delegation 
coordinates the agendas with the Member States and chairs the coordination 
meetings”.42 The intensity of these coordination meetings, and also the concrete 
policy outputs, depend on the specific interests of the Member State in a policy field 
and their ambitions in terms of visibility in a given third country. Knowing that Member 
State Embassies function in accordance with a principal-agent approach with their 
respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the logic of hierarchy is still present in sensitive 
CFSP matters, for which “the common output of local coordination is sent from the 
field to coordination groups in Brussels”. 43  From a socialisation perspective, the 
taking-over of the Presidency tasks led, to different degrees and depending on the 
diplomatic importance given to a particular third country, to an increasingly leading 
role of the EU Delegations whose action is accepted and expected by Member 
States and third actors.44  
The EU Delegation as service-provider in information-sharing: hierarchies vs. networks 
The EEAS Decision states that “the Union Delegations shall work in close cooperation 
and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States”, and the 
Delegations provide concrete input thus demonstrating their supporting role towards 
the Member States’ missions.45 The EU Delegation is thus under an obligation to work 
with the Member State embassies in order to “ensure that decisions defining Union 
                                                          
41  B. Hocking et al., "Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st century", 
Clingendael Report, no. 1, The Hague, The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 
October 2012, p. 68. 
42 J. Wouters, “The Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service: 
Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities”, Study for the European Parliament, DG 
External Policies, EXPO/B/AFET/2012/07, February 2013, p. 70.  
43 Ibid. 
44 J. Jupille et al., “States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental 
Politics”, in Carolyn Rhodes (ed.), The European Union in the World Community, London, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 216.  
45 Article 5(9) EEAS Decision. 
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positions and actions are complied with and implemented”.46 It is worth mentioning, 
however, that the March 2010 draft of the EEAS Decision stipulated a reciprocal 
obligation for the Member States to share information. 47 The current wording of 
Article 5(9), referring only to Delegations, highlights the Member States’ perception of 
an enhanced supporting hierarchical relationship with the EU Delegations, rather 
than mutual sharing of information in networks. However, the Member States also fall 
under the general obligation to work with the Delegations, mainly under the ‘sincere 
cooperation’ principle (Article 4(3) TEU), the loyalty obligation (Article 24(3) TEU), but 
also the cooperation obligation between Member State and EU missions (Article 
32(3)).48  
In reality, there are some concrete political outputs shared by the EU Delegations. 
The Head of Delegation is instructed to send the monthly political reports to Member 
State diplomats who are present or accredited in the third country. But information-
sharing also happens on a daily basis and covers various policy sectors, depending 
on the division of labour among burden-sharers.49 Since information-sharing requires 
information-gathering, many Member States expect the EU Delegations to collect 
information “only on those matters that are within the competence of the EU, not in 
bilateral issues”.50 A joint daily reporting could include press reviews and analyses, 
minutes of meetings, but also economic and political intelligence. Undoubtedly, 
“reporting by the Delegation allows the Member States to progressively develop a 
common view”, which thereafter facilitates coordination. 51  Reporting on more 
security-based issues also takes place and is key for consolidating the diplomatic role 
of the Delegations.52  
As for reciprocity, the process of information-sharing seems to be more unidirectional. 
However, the flow of information and the level of politically-sensitive questions 
covered depend on the Member States’ strategic interests and diplomatic 
capacities on the ground. Thus, the added value of sharing information is lower in big 
third countries, for instance the BRICS, while in small “forgotten countries” this input is 
                                                          
46 Wouters, “The Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service”, 
op.cit., p. 70. 
47 Blockmans, “EEAS 2.0: A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing 
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more appreciated by the Member States.53 As regards the Member States sharing 
information, this is rather problematic because they are generally reluctant to share 
politically sensitive reports and notes on ‘high politics’. 54  There are other, more 
technical reasons for not having a well-functioning information sharing at local or 
headquarters level.  
To date, information by the EU Delegation is only shared among the Member States’ 
diplomats present or accredited in the host state through the internal 
communication systems COREU or AGORA which are not secured. For that reason, 
the EU is deploying Acid, an encrypted communication system, which allows EU 
Delegation and Member States to be technically equipped to share information 
securely among themselves and directly with the capitals.55 Successful information 
sharing directly depends on adequate burden-sharing, making good use of the 
available resources and obliging the sharers to report on sector-specific issues such 
as energy and trade. However, when reluctant to share information, Member States 
can ostensibly narrow down the EU’s actorness, such as in the case of the UK not 
willing to ‘share’ intelligence with the EEAS on the Iranian nuclear dossier.56 
In addition, the level and quality of information sharing depends also on the 
personality of the HoD, and some countries – such as France – consider that the 
Delegation should focus more on political reporting providing greater substance for 
the Member States.57 To sum up, more information-sharing and joint reporting leads 
to more common understanding and thus facilitates coordination and coherence of 
the EU’s and Member States’ actions.  
The changing practice of diplomacy: challenges and opportunities for the EU’s 
diplomatic network  
 
The Member States’ decreasing number of missions: towards a post-modern 
diplomacy? 
 
“It is an exciting opportunity for the institutions and our Member States to respond to 
the changing nature of diplomacy in a globalised world”, noted David O’Sullivan, 
the Chief Operating Officer of the EEAS, commenting on the future of national 
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diplomacy. 58  Undoubtedly, the role of Foreign Ministries is changing from a 
Westphalian state-centred diplomatic practice towards a post-modern diplomacy 
characterised by a network of action.59 In this context, the Member States’ decision 
to close consulates and embassies is in direct correlation with the existing budgetary 
constraints, leading to other decisive steps on further rationalising diplomatic 
network.60 In addition, the importance given to physical presence in representing a 
State is also decreasing in a post-modern diplomatic environment.61 For instance, the 
Netherlands closed more than ten embassies and consulates during the last three 
years, for example those in Cameroon, Eritrea, Ecuador, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, and 
Zambia.62 Many other small- and medium-sized EU countries closed embassies or 
consulates. 63  But even if “cutting down consulates is preferred over closing 
embassies due to the relatively less political and economic damage involved”, the 
question is to what extent the existence of an EU Delegation in the country where a 
Member State closes or reduces the staff is taken into consideration? 64 One UK 
diplomat noted when commenting on this issue that, “although we are working 
closely with the new EEAS [...], there is not and will never be any substitute for a 
strong British diplomatic service that advances the interest of the United Kingdom”.65 
Other countries such as Finland consider that clear arrangements on ‘lap-top 
diplomats’ could reduce the damage of closing missions.66 Meanwhile, the EEAS’s 
priority is to keep “the largest network possible”, which consists today of 140 
Delegations. 67  In 2013, the EU closed its Delegation in Suriname and opened a 
Delegation to Myanmar and one to the United Arab Emirates.68  
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The practice of co-location is a remarkable example of the way in which Member 
States recognise EU Delegations as the right partner to cooperate with.69 Co-location 
happens mostly in bilateral diplomatic posts in which, in general terms, Member 
States do not have strategic interests and particular concerns of being visible 
through their autonomous missions. This example also illustrates how the combination 
of rational-choice behaviour (in terms of budgetary constraints) and de facto 
socialisation among European diplomats on the ground results in co-location 
practices in many third countries. But to what extent can this be perceived as a 
challenge or an opportunity for the EU’s diplomatic network?  
Co-location: increasing awareness on the EU Delegations’ potential  
Co-location in bilateral diplomatic fora is an increasingly recurrent practice. Before 
the creation of the EEAS, many projects on co-location were concluded, for instance 
at the EU Delegation in Kabul to host the Lithuanian Ambassador, the EU Delegation 
in Nouakchott to host the UK, and the EU Delegation in Abuja to host Italy and the 
Netherlands.70 In addition, the EU Delegation can share premises with institutions. The 
more common practice is to host the EU Special Representative (EUSR), or ECHO 
officials, but also CFSP/CSDP missions, such as EUCAP Nestor hosted in the EU 
Delegation in Nairobi, or EUCAM Sahel Niger in the EU Delegation in Bamako. Thus, in 
April 2014, there were 34 arrangements on co-location between both institutions and 
EU Member States, while 13 EU Delegations are hosting one or more Member 
States.71 It is worth mentioning that even countries with global interests and huge 
diplomatic networks entered into co-location arrangements, for example France in 
East Timor and South Sudan, or the UK in Iraq, Mauritania, South Sudan and Tanzania; 
Spain is leading with five co-locations, followed by the Netherlands with four.72  
But is this practice simply motivated by cost-benefit calculations in a rational-choice 
perspective? What are the motivations of the Member States? It is noteworthy that in 
press releases announcing the closing of missions or consulates, Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs do not link, at least not officially, the closure with the possible cooperation and 
eventually co-location with an EU Delegation. In a longer term, the good record of 
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co-location could lead to a “shift in thinking in that diplomatic representation might 
no longer be seen in strictly national terms, but instead managed cooperation with 
close partners”. 73  Beyond the rationalist point of view, and from a socialisation 
standpoint, the fact that Member States choose the EU Delegation to enter into co-
location arrangements reveals the existence of a certain level of trust.74 Henceforth, 
co-location leads to more socialisation, but does not have any legal consequences 
in terms of representation as the Member State concerned is represented by its 
officials and this has no implications for the EU’s role.75 In terms of acceptance and 
prestige, the increasing number of co-location arrangements is proof that the EU 
Delegation is becoming more established and enjoys a certain level of trust among 
the Member States.  
The EU Delegation as ‘House of Europe’?  
The EEAS is more flexible than the Member States with its network as it rents around 
80% of the premises.76 France, on the contrary, owns 80%. In terms of the closing or 
opening of a Delegation, the EEAS is able to quickly re-allocate resources, but also to 
offer additional office space for co-location and ‘lap-top diplomats’. In practical 
terms, a Memorandum of Understanding is signed between the Head of Mission and 
the EU HoD. The Member State is hosted in the premises of the EU Delegation on the 
same administrative and financial conditions, for instance in case the EU Delegation 
rents its premises, the Member State pays the same rent per m².77 Member States also 
benefit from common security and all other kinds of infrastructures and services. It is 
worth quoting the press release on the first co-location between the EEAS and a 
Member State, in this case Luxembourg:  
Ambassador Marchal [EU HoD] underlined his great satisfaction of being able to 
contribute in a practical manner to the concrete implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty in its external dimension, and all the more so since it concerns the 
establishment of a new Embassy of a Member State of the EU.78 
The Ambassador of Luxembourg noted the “numerous operational and practical 
synergies” and that “such an approach cannot but contribute to reinforcing the 
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profile of the EU in the third countries concerned”.79 There are additional reasons why 
the EEAS promotes co-location practices. First, it helps to save operational costs, 
both for the EEAS and the Member States and, second, to use the premises’ full 
capacity. 80  In addition, from a socialisation point of view, it helps the overall 
coordination process as there is more communication between staff. Co-location 
also enhances the credibility and visibility of the EU as an actor as the EU diplomatic 
network is the frontrunner in the eyes of third actors.  
However, a decision on co-location depends to a large extent on the Member 
States’ direct strategic interests in the third country concerned. Thus, looking at the 
existing co-locations, they are present in relatively small African, Central Asian or Far 
East countries, but not in countries like Russia or China which are strategic partners 
both for the Member States and the EU as a whole. African EU Delegations host on 
average three Member State missions, followed by Middle Eastern and Asian 
Delegations co-locating one Member State. Thus, the motivations are most probably 
a combination of weaker strategic interests and cost-efficient solutions to share the 
security bill in unstable countries.  
Therefore, the decision to further enhance the EU Delegations’ role by entering into 
co-location arrangements depends on the Member States’ ambitions of visibility in a 
given country. Meanwhile, these practices are making the EU Delegation a primus 
inter pares leading the coordination and increasingly delivering common products 
as the keeper of the diplomatic ‘House of Europe’ or ‘Campus européen’, defined 
as “centres of mini-diplomatic missions of the smaller member states”.81  
Pooling of resources and burden-sharing in bilateral diplomacy 
As noted recently, “it is widely observed that the entire EU external action process 
suffers from a troubling waste of human resources, especially with respect to 
reporting”.82 This study also provides the example of economic reports sent by each 
of the Member States represented to their capitals, while few of the Member States 
have the resources to write in-depth reports.83 However, once again, this depends on 
the Member States’ strategic or specific trade and economic interests in the country. 
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Furthermore, the pooling of resources could be based on practical arrangements 
between the EU Delegation and the Member States, making the best use of officials’ 
expertise (shared reporting). As a matter of example, separate teams could cover 
different sectors or thematic policies. The same division of labour could also apply to 
daily activities such as press reviews, notes and media communication.84 As regards 
burden-sharing, there are good examples on thematic cooperation on human rights 
matters. For instance, the EU Delegation to Mexico and the Member States 
represented (21 national Embassies) divided the country on a geographical basis 
and every burden-sharer is responsible for a respective region.85 The practice of joint 
human rights reporting and elaboration of common local human rights strategies 
create also a sense of ownership by the Member States and improve the 
implementation of the EU’s human rights policy.86  
Other examples of burden-sharing in bilateral diplomacy are cases in which the EU 
representation is exercised by a Member State.87 As to ensure coherence, the EEAS 
and/or the Commission guides the Presidency, but also the Member States can 
make suggestions on CFSP action or coordinate local statements and démarches.88 
Furthermore, in cases where the rotating Presidency has no mission, the EU opted for 
practical arrangements on a six-month period of representation with the Member 
States disposing of resident missions in these third countries.89 Hence, even in cases 
where the Presidency or a Member State represent the EU, the EEAS shall ensure that 
the EU’s priorities are followed. 
In practice, it seems that the EEAS and the post-Lisbon EU Delegations are boosting 
more integration and burden-sharing with the Member States.90 In order to further 
improve this, more cooperation is needed between the HoDs, the EEAS and the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs as well as closer coordination on possible common actions 
on the ground.  
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Towards a European diplomatic system: the EU Delegation as motor of socialisation? 
The ‘European diplomatic system’ could be defined as intra-European foreign policy 
management driven by Brussels and the Member States’ foreign ministries. 91 The 
emergence of such a system, however, depends on a clear division of responsibilities 
and on common diplomatic training in order to consolidate a shared diplomatic 
culture. Without further linking the evolution of the nature of diplomacy and its 
practice in light of globalisation and regionalisation in world politics, the question 
arises how the EU can respond to the decline of traditional state-centric diplomacy? 
In the EU’s complex multilevel practice of diplomacy, Member States are no longer 
able to work according to strictly national timetables which are increasingly 
Europeanised by the EU’s agenda, resulting in the emergence of an intra-European 
diplomacy.92 A prime example is the Presidency trio where the agenda is formulated 
in a process of permanent interaction with the institutions. Therefore, the EU 
diplomatic system is seen as a bi-multilateral diplomacy of two interconnected levels 
– the EU Delegation and the Member States. 
Increasing the awareness of Member States of the EU Delegation’s added value is a 
product of socialisation. Member States suggested, for instance, the need to 
strengthen political sections and reporting in the Delegations. Accordingly, in 2011-
12, 120 new Administrators positions were opened only for political sections.93 In 
addition, the Member State diplomats represent already 45% of the staff in 
Delegations, which is less from the approximately 35% of national diplomats at the 
EEAS. Therefore, Member States are aware of the potential of the EU Delegations 
and the fact that they send more national diplomats to Delegations reveals the high 
level of trust and the arising common vision of a European diplomatic system. 
But if we assume that Member States are committed to count more on EU 
Delegations, could this be a challenge for the EU’s diplomatic network in a context 
of decreasing numbers of national embassies and consulates and a reluctance to 
increase the budget of the EEAS? For instance, the EEAS “has based its draft budget 
for 2014 on a rigorous approach and a search for economy across the board”.94 This 
draft budget foresees a reduction by 1% of the number of posts, but also a 
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downgrading of senior level officials and reductions in the allowances for staff in EU 
Delegations, while the EEAS requests a net increase of 4% of its budget.95 The overall 
increase for EU Delegations was by 0.8%. 96  This increase goes mainly for 
remunerations and entitlements of statutory staff (+4.5%), buildings and associated 
costs (+3.4%). Finally, the overall budget for Delegations for 2014 is around €322 
million.97 In general terms, a Delegation’s budget is determined according to its 
mandate and should be able to guarantee its fulfilment (on average from €1 to 3 
million for a Delegation). 98  From an administrative point of view, there is no 
differentiation between bilateral and multilateral EU Delegations. 99  Even if the 
budget of the EEAS was increased, while considering the need for more cost-
effective diplomacy, a more ambitious increase of the budget is needed to further 
use the EU Delegations’ full potential. As a matter of comparison, the EU-27 
diplomatic and consular networks cost €7,529 million in 2010, or €15 per capita, 
compared to only €1 for the EEAS.100 
To sum up, further consolidation of the EU Delegations’ role would certainly boost the 
creation of a ‘European diplomatic system’, which will most probably appear in small 
mini-diplomatic bilateral settings, in which the EU Delegation will play a central role. 
Meanwhile, in big bilateral posts dealing extensively with development cooperation 
or the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU Delegations are challenged by 
complex issues of horizontal coherence, but also by the lack of sufficient capacities 
to cover and follow all the initiatives coming from the Member States.  
The Delegation support and evaluation: what role for the Member States?  
This part will show the extent to which the Member States share their expectations 
and provide feedback on the EU Delegations to the EEAS. The EEAS Delegation 
Support and Evaluation Service (DSES) will for this purpose by analysed. The Service’s 
responsibilities of guiding and supporting EU Delegations (while also mandated with 
financial and administrative audits) derive from the EEAS Decision stipulating that the 
operation of each Delegation shall be periodically evaluated.101 In practice, every 
Delegation needs to be evaluated once within the four-year mandate of the HoD, 
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which is done by conducting on-the-spot evaluations.102 The DSES’s missions (usually 
consisting of 2 people) cover the work of the Delegation as a whole (EEAS and 
Commission competences except for external cooperation programmes), and 
evaluate the implementation of and contribution to EU policies (the quality of 
reports), the use and management of resources (integration of the staff); security 
issues such as protection of classified information, and overall financial and 
administration management.103 The Service can adapt the criteria according to the 
specificities of the environment in which the EU Delegation operates.104 Before going 
on mission, the team consults the cabinet and the respective EEAS desks and 
Commission services “as well as other key stakeholders”.105 But do Member States 
have a say in the evaluation of EU Delegations? Interestingly, the Mission Statement 
foresees that: 
Over time and where possible the DSES may also be tasked with conducting joint 
missions with Member States covering both EU Delegations and Member State 
Embassies, subject to definition of the scope of such missions (limited to EEAS 
remit).106 
Furthermore, the team should also have contacts with MS Ambassadors and/or 
representatives of international organisations. In practice, there are many formal and 
informal on-spot contacts which facilitate acquiring local feedback, while in Brussels 
regular meetings are organised between the General Secretariat of the EEAS and its 
counterparts in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs.107 The DSES also provides advice to 
the HoD and to the EEAS with concrete points on how to improve the effectiveness, 
efficiency and quality of their activities. This could be particularly helpful for a 
national diplomat appointed as HoD who does not have enough EU-related 
experience.108 Interestingly, some recommendations in the evaluation reports and 
the Action Plans (elaborated after each mission) may also be addressed to the 
Commission.  
The DSES feedback on EU Delegations demonstrates that they execute well their 
post-Lisbon responsibilities, but more needs to be done for the integration of all staff 
members, the reinforcement of security measures (almost everywhere) and the need 
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to strengthen the EU Delegations’ administrative and financial capacities. 109 
Therefore, there appears to be a good coordination by the EU Delegation which 
certainly enhances its role, while in the long term the above-mentioned 
shortcomings need to be tackled in order to use the EU Delegations’ full potential.  
Conclusions  
This paper examines the extent to which the socialisation between EU Delegations 
and Member State missions helps Delegations to fulfil their mandate in bilateral 
diplomacy. It has been demonstrated that Member State Embassies increasingly 
accept and expect EU Delegations’ actions. Furthermore, the study has shown that 
there is neither one prototype of Delegation, nor a single mandate, but rather a 
complex variety of Delegations fulfilling different roles according to the key policies 
involved and the degree of socialisation with the Member States. The EU Delegations 
are in a continuing process of institutional socialisation with the Member State 
Embassies in which the EU Delegations’ actions are increasingly in line with the logic 
of appropriateness. In the meantime, the Member States’ willingness to cooperate 
and the EU Delegation’s resources and management, as well as the role of the Head 
of Delegation, determine the extent to which the Delegation fulfils its mandate.  
The post-Lisbon responsibilities of the EU Delegations are in the process of 
consolidating a primus inter pares role of Delegations as central hubs implementing 
and coordinating EU policies on the spot. Research into bilateral diplomacy 
examined key developments in co-location and burden-sharing, highlighting the 
dynamic processes of socialisation which reveal the emerging perception among 
Member States of an EU diplomatic network which they can trust.  
In the near future, the erosion of the link between presence and access to 
diplomacy can lead Member States to rely more on the EU diplomatic network. 
Expectations are that in small third states, the ‘European Embassy’ will become a 
reality as an example of cost-efficient post-modern diplomacy. This would lead to a 
higher degree of coherence and trust between Member States and EU Delegations 
as a product of continuing socialisation. To speculate further, we could expect EU 
diplomats to formally represent Member States in these countries which is now 
impossible as national and diplomatic law do not allow delegating the right to 
represent to a non-state actor.   
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